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COVERED BONDS: THE RENAISSANCE OF AN OLD ACQUAINTANCE
Mortgage finance activity entails long term risks for financial institutions. Thus, it is not 
surprising that financial institutions have developed several ways to back their mortgage 
activities either by transferring the risk (securitizations), by means of public government 
guarantees (Government sponsored enterprises) or by creating long-term and low risk 
liabilities backed by these assets (covered bonds). This article focuses on the third model, 
whose presence is rapidly increasing at the global level. Covered bonds have been a 
traditional funding instrument whose double recourse (against the bank and a specific 
pool of assets) makes them particularly safe and really attractive among a stable and 
conservative group of investors. 
Several European countries had an old dated legislation for covered bonds as an instrument 
to fund both mortgages and public sector credit. These legislations contain several 
peculiarities due to legal and cultural differences, something that was compatible with a 
very fragmented and home-biased market. The creation of the monetary union eased the 
possibility to broad internationally the investor base, moreover authorities introduced 
several changes to develop secondary markets.
The global financial crisis induced a new wave of changes for covered bond markets 
exerting higher pressure towards an increased harmonization among countries. Covered 
bonds became more attractive as investors realized the complexity of alternative instruments 
like securitizations. Nevertheless, covered bonds were not completely immune to the 
financial crisis, although their movements were more linked to collateral valuations. In 
particular, covered bond spreads rose with higher intensity during this period in those 
countries more affected by housing price overvaluation problems (like Spain or United 
Kingdom). Later on, covered bonds became affected by the European sovereign debt crisis 
as concerns arose about the relationship between sovereign and banking risk, although this 
market showed higher resilience than, for example, the unsecured debt market. 
Under this environment several important structural changes are reshaping covered bond 
markets. Firstly, several jurisdictions introduced new legislative frameworks to facilitate 
diversification of the funding sources for their banks. At the same time, investors became 
more aware of issues like transparency of covered pools or the situation of covered bond 
holders in resolution processes. This is resulting in a harmonization trend not only among 
new legislations, but also through amendments of the existing ones. Finally, financial 
regulators are introducing several changes at the international level (i.e. Basel III capital or 
liquidity requirements) that contain incentives that foster covered bond demand. 
This article reviews with some detail all of these issues. Section 2 describes the main 
characteristics that define a covered bond; Section 3 reviews the main market trends 
identified in covered bond markets previous and along the financial and sovereign debt 
crisis; Section 4 focuses on the regulatory environment, describing the main characteristics 
of older and new legislations, and the consequences for covered bonds of some of the 
financial regulatory changes in the pipeline. Finally, Section 5 concludes identifying the main 
milestones for this market in the future.
There is no common definition for covered bonds at the international level, although there 
are some basic characteristics that a debt security must satisfy to be considered as such:
1  Introduction
2  Understanding 
covered bonds
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— Double recourse: Investors in covered bonds have two different claims that 
secure their investment; they have a claim over the originator, who must 
satisfy the payment of principal and interest; and, in case of issuer’s default, 
bondholders have a preference claim over the pool of assets that serve as 
collateral.
— Cover-pool assets remain on the balance sheet of the issuer, so credit risk is 
retained by the originator which aligns incentives with those of investors (and 
avoids some of the problems related with the originate-to-distribute model, 
(Bernanke 2009)). However, it is important to note that in general these assets 
are usually placed aside from the rest of assets, thus clearly identifying them 
and assuring that covered bond holders have a priority claim over them 
compared to the rest of creditors. 
— Covered bonds are “over-collateralized”, that is, assets in the cover-pool 
exceed the notional value of the bond thus assuring the timely payments of 
interests and principal even if the originator fails.
— Moreover, the cover-pool is dynamic, that is, the quality of the cover-pool 
must be maintained over time (in case some assets deteriorate or pre-paid, 
then they must be replaced by assets of the same quality as the ones initially 
posed). Obviously, in case of bankruptcy of the originator these dynamics are 
broken and the cover pool becomes static.
Thus covered bonds are a form of secured debt that also shares some characteristics of 
securitized products, so in some sense they could be interpreted as a mixed instrument 
between both classes of debt securities (see Table 1 for a comparison among covered 
bonds, ordinary debt bonds and mortgage backed bonds). In fact, covered bonds have 
been described as a form of “on-balance sheet securitization” [Mastroeni (2001)].
There are two main types of covered bonds: legislative and structured covered bonds. First, 
in some countries these instruments are issued under a specific legislative framework 
(legislative covered bonds) thus their characteristics are established by statutory law 
(presenting multiple idiosyncrasies among different countries, Section 4). Secondly, covered 
bonds might be issued through private contractual agreements (structured covered bonds). 
The development of this market segment has been motivated mainly by an attempt to 
access to this type of funding in those jurisdictions lacking covered bond legislation (i.e. 
UK, Canada, Netherlands, US, etc.), or as a way to obtain higher flexibility in countries 
where a legislative framework is already in place. For example, most national legislations 
establish certain criteria regarding assets eligible for the cover pool (type, loan-to-value, 
etc.). Some issuers might use private agreements in order to include other assets non-
eligible under these legislations. One recent example is the small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) structured covered bond issued by Commerzbank on February 2013, 
which replicates exactly the structure of German legislative covered bonds with loans to 
SMEs used as collateral assets (non eligible under German covered bond legislation).
Given their characteristics, the next obvious question is why issuers have incentives to 
choose covered bonds instead of other ways of funding. One of the main advantages of 
these securities compared to unsecured debt is that they provide relatively cheaper long-
term funding as the double recourse nature partly delinks the credit quality of the bond to 
the one of the issuer. Thus, the ratings of covered bonds tend to be high (most of them are 
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rated Aaa or Aa1). Moreover, covered bonds have performed relatively better during stress 
periods, or at least they have recovered earlier in case of collapse.2 Part of this evolution 
is related to the fact that, given their safeness, these bonds attract investors that 
traditionally were focused on ultra safe debt as they offer relatively higher yields at reduced 
credit risk. The access to this stable investor base by the issuer constitutes an advantage 
as it improves conditions for future issuances and refinancing activity. The comparison 
with secured funding is slightly different since issuers look mainly for capital relief and not 
for liquidity management (as it is the case with covered bonds) when they use secured 
instruments like residential mortgage back securities [Carbo et al. (2011)]. 
From the investor’s side, the attractiveness of this type of bonds relies mostly on their high 
credit quality that is accompanied by higher yields compared to those offered by government 
or state-guaranteed bonds. Second, their exclusion from bail-in resolution tools make them 
more attractive compared to unsecured debt. Third, liquidity3 and capital regulation4 give 
them a favourable treatment. Finally, covered bonds are also accepted under relatively 
good terms under repo transactions by some central banks such as the European Central 
Bank or the Bank of England, which increases it attractiveness as it facilitates the access to 
1  Moody’s (2010).
2  ECBC (2012) highlights that this form of funding was one of the first in recover access in capital markets among 
those debt securities without state guarantees after the Lehman collapse. 
3  Covered bonds are eligible as liquid assets under Basel III. 
4  For example, UCITS (European Commission directive that regulates investments of retail investment funds) 
allows investors to have a higher exposure than other investments because of their high credit quality. Moreover, 
Solvency II establishes a spread risk factor of 0.6% to covered bonds AAA-rated compared to 0.9% for senior 
unsecured and corporate AAA-rated bond.
Covered Bonds Ordinary Secured Bonds Asset Backed Securities
Issuer Regulated credit institution, 
subject to prudential oversight. 
Regulated credit institution, 
subject to prudential oversight.
Special Purpose Vehicle.
Balance sheet treatment On-balance-sheet funding, 
though cover pool assets are 
segregated for exclusive bene?t 
of covered bond investors.
On-balance-sheet funding with 
no segregation of collateral 
assets.
Assets packaged and sold to 
investors for purposes of off-
balance-sheet sale treatment, risk 
and capital reduction.
Investor recourse in event 
of default
“Dual recourse”. Investors have 
sole right to proceeds of cover 
pool assets and, if cover pool 
collateral is insuf?cient, an 
unsecured claim against the 
issuing bank.
Recourse to the issuer in case of 
collateral de?ciency.
If collateral in pool is insuf?cient, 
bondholders suffer the loss, with 
no recourse to issuing bank.
Payment source and schedule Typically, principal and interests
 are paid from bank cash ?ows, 
with cover pool serving only as 
collateral. Principal is returned in 
a “bullet” installment at maturity 
of bonds. No prepayment risk.
Typically, principal and interests 
are paid from bank cash ?ows, 
with cover pool serving only as 
collateral. Principal is returned in 
a “bullet” installment at maturity 
of bonds.
Principal and interest are paid 
solely from the proceeds of asset 
in pool. Principal is returned as 
individual assets mature, with 
prepayments passed through to 
investors.
Asset pool management and 
structure
Dynamic collateral management, 
with substitution allowed and 
required for non-eligible assets.                                              
Single class of bonds, generally 
overcollateralized.
Static pool, so if 
overcollateralization exists  
it might not be maintained.
Static pool, with investors 
bearing risk of any asset-quality 
deterioration.
Multiple tranches, with senior  
and subordinate classes having 
varying degrees of credit 
enhancement.
COVERED BONDS VERSUS ORDINARY SECURED BONDS AND SECURITIZATIONS TABLE 1
SOURCES: Moody’s (2010), Schwarcz (2011).
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central bank’s liquidity facilities and funding programs (a characteristic that becomes 
especially important during stress periods). 
Given all these features it is not surprising that demand for covered bonds is highly 
concentrated on long term investors with hold-to-maturity strategies. Under these 
circumstances, the development of a deep secondary market that serves as reference for 
investors might be challenging. The enhancement of liquidity on covered bond markets 
started with the introduction of the euro and the possibility to broad internationally the 
investor base. Under this environment, authorities created the Jumbo Pfandbrief market in 
1995. This model has become the foundation for other benchmark-covered bond models 
in other European countries (such as Austria, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain 
and United Kingdom). Basically, the Jumbo model contains a set of rules that mainly refer 
to size, format, issuance and buybacks practices. The key feature of this model relies on 
the commitment of market makers for a limited amount of cash orders, a feature that 
increases transparency and guaranties investors a minimum amount of bond trading. 
Liquidity is also complemented with the activity on repo operations with covered bonds. In 
this case, an additional agreement was created in 1998 among 17 banks through the 
Financial Markets Association to establish market making commitments in the repo 
market. As it is the case in other financial markets, repo activity is highly interconnected 
with cash transactions and liquidity (or the lack of it) goes in parallel among them (something 
that became evident during some episodes of the recent crisis5). The liquidity framework 
was completed with the acceptance of covered bonds by electronic trading platforms.6 
However, the importance of electronic trading is limited and nowadays almost half of the 
transactions are still executed through voice agreements.7 
In order to assess the level of liquidity on this market, Table 2 presents a measure based on 
differences between ask and bid transactions on secondary markets in relation to the ask 
level. Covered bonds present similar liquidity levels than other private fixed income products 
but significantly lower than public debt. Meanwhile liquidity differs among jurisdictions and 
this heterogeneity is higher than the one observed for other credit instruments. 
SOURCE: Barclays.
a LCS = (Ask price-Bid price) / Bid price.
Covered bonds Credit bonds
France 0.602 0.825
Germany 0.416 0.755
Spain 1.775 0.579
United Kingdom 0.52 0.892
Sweden 0.42 0.542
Denmark 0.661 0.731
Italy 1.199 0.86
Netherlands 0.385 0.58
Annex Global Covered Bonds Index Pan-Euro Treasury Index Pan-Euro Credit Index
October 2012 0.773 0.193 0.745
LCS (a) FOR THE GLOBAL COVERED BONDS INDEX BY COUNTRY (OCTOBER 2012) TABLE 2
5  Engelhard et al. (2012)
6  Covered bonds could be traded in multidealer platforms (Euro MTS and Eurex), Customer platforms (Tradeweb, 
Bondvision of Bloomberg) and individual client platforms.
7  SIFMA (2009).
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Covered bonds noticeably increased their importance in the years preceding the financial 
crisis (2003-2007), establishing themselves as a key stable funding source for financial in-
stitutions, and, more specifically, for European banks. In general, covered bond issuance 
increased during these years in parallel to the growth of European mortgage lending to 
households. The foundations for this growth had been already laid a decade before with 
the launch of the first Jumbo covered bonds in 1995 out of Germany and the development 
of a favourable European legislation for covered bonds (Directive 85/611/EEC on 
undertakings for collective investments in transferable securities, UCITS, and, afterwards, 
the Capital Requirements Directive, CRD). In parallel to the growing liquidity of these 
instruments and the adoption of the euro, covered bonds started to attract global investors. 
Furthermore, the geographical range of these instruments also expanded amid the 
enactment or revision of national covered bonds legislations in several European countries 
(Section 4.1). In this context, the amount outstanding of covered bonds increased by a 
35% since 2003 to a total of over EUR 2 trillion in 2007 [ECBC (2012)]. Gross issuance of 
covered bonds increased until 2007 as well, when USD 374 bln covered bonds were 
placed in the global markets (unless otherwise indicated, retained issuance is excluded 
from all the figures of gross issuance in the text8) and, if Germany is excluded from the 
sample, issuance almost three-folded (Chart 1, panel A). In this period, issuance took off 
in countries such as Ireland and Italy, and structured covered bonds (those not backed by 
a dedicated legislation) were first launched in the UK (Morgan Stanley, 2011). Meanwhile, 
gross issuance from Germany steadily decreased since 2003.9 
During the first phase of the financial crisis (august 2007-september 2008), amid a higher 
risk aversion, issuance of securitizations slumped worldwide (from USD 1,3 trillion in 2007 
to USD 171 bln in 2008) and unsecured bonds’ activity (excluding government guaranteed 
debt) decreased by a 22%, whereas covered bonds issuance decreased less and mostly in 
certain countries such as the UK and Spain. In consequence, covered bond issuance, 
whilst certainly affected, showed however a higher resilience to the financial turmoil than 
3  Market trends
8  Retained covered bonds are those placed in a bank’s own book usually in order to create collateral for its central 
bank operations [LBBW (2011)].
9  This declining trend, which continues up till now was partially related to the gradual reduction of public-sector 
Pfandbriefe’s issuance, especially since 2005.
SOURCE: Dealogic.
a Registered German covered bonds are not included in Dealogic.
b Finland is not included in this category, it is included in the “Other Euroarea” group. Nordic coverage of covered bond issuance by Dealogic is not representative of 
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other debt securities (Chart 2).10 In fact, even though secondary spreads of euro covered 
bonds started to deteriorate,11 they widened less than senior euro financial debt spreads 
(Chart 3, panel A) [ECB (2008)]. On the other hand, although retained covered bonds 
increased significantly in 2008, to a large extent they were originated by British issuers in 
the context of the Special Liquidity Scheme launched by the Bank of England in April 2008. 
With the intensification of the crisis in September 2008, covered bond markets also came 
under pressure. In the primary markets, issuance in 2008 Q4 and 2009 Q1 fell to its lowest 
levels since 2004. Furthermore, average spreads in the primary and secondary markets 
increased significantly as well12 – also for French and German covered bonds, which had 
been relatively immune to the turmoil so far, with only a slight widening of their spreads 
SOURCE: Dealogic.
a We only consider non-retained issuance with maturity above or equal to 1,5 years and from private bank parent issuers. As such we consider Hypo Real Estate Holding 
and ING Groep, too. Only banks of those countries that have issued at least one covered bond since 2003, according to Dealogic, are included in the sample.
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10  When comparisons between secured and unsecured instruments are done, we only consider non-retained 
issuance with maturity above or equal to 1,5 years and from private bank parent issuers. As such we consider 
Hypo Real Estate Holding and ING Groep, too.
11  Covered bond spreads had been up until 2007 quite homogeneous between European countries. This trend 
reverted when the financial crisis began and UK and Spanish spreads widened more than for other countries.
12  Many deals in Dealogic do not show this information, so the average is done on a smaller sample than the one 
used for total issuance.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 75 ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 24
(Chart 3, panel B) and liquidity in secondary markets deteriorated. In this context, the ECB 
announced on May 2009 the first Covered Bond Purchase Program (CBPP1) with the aim 
of encouraging the recovery of this market through the outright purchases of these 
instruments. Indeed, this program (in a context of general better financial conditions) led 
to the reactivation of covered bond issuance activity and to the tightening of secondary 
market and bid-offer spreads. However, the reactivation of covered bond markets could 
have been at the expense of the uncovered bank bonds: The program might have not been 
able to increase the outstanding amounts of bank debt [ECB (2011)] in a context where 
senior debt funding was more expensive than covered bonds or the senior market was 
closed for certain issuers. As such in the first half of 2010, the share of covered bonds 
issued to uncollaterized debt (excluding government guaranteed debt) in the euro area 
jumped from 47% to 83%, when compared with the same period of 2009. 
In 2010, in a context of declining housing prices and higher mortgage loan defaults in 
some countries, the first wave of the European sovereign debt crisis hit global markets. 
The increase in sovereign debt risk affected covered bonds trough several channels, being 
one of them the reduction of the public sector’s ability to bail out banks (“implicit subsidy”). 
As a result, the euro area covered bond primary and secondary market split roughly in two: 
Peripheral13 and non-peripheral. By the end of 2010 covered bond markets were almost 
closed for Irish and Portuguese issuers, while Italian and Spanish issuance weakened 
significantly after 2011 Q1 (Chart 1, panel A). In parallel to this, peripheral banks turned to 
retained covered bonds as an alternative source of funding and were the main issuers of these 
instruments from 2009 onwards (Chart 1, panel B). On the other hand, issuance of covered 
bonds from France, Switzerland or the Netherlands was buoyant in both 2010 and 201114 
since non-peripheral countries covered bonds were overall considered as very safe 
investments in a context of high risk aversion. In the secondary markets, the spreads 
between peripheral and non-peripheral covered bonds’ significantly drifted apart.15 Thus, 
in this period covered bonds were probably more strongly affected by the performance of 
their respective sovereign bonds than by their own idiosyncrasies. The intensifying market 
turmoil led to the introduction by the ECB of a new Covered Bond Purchase Program 
(CBPP2) by the end of 2011. However, covered bond secondary spreads tightened mainly 
as a consequence of the 3-year Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) carried out by 
the ECB in December 2011 and February 2012, only to widen again as the effects of this 
LTROs started to wear off [Engelhard, F. M. Seimen and J. Harju (2012)]. European covered 
bond secondary market spreads have been steadily drifting lower since the ECB´s strong 
commitment to the euro made in the summer 2012. However, these spreads are overall 
wider than before the financial crisis and peripheral covered bonds are still significantly 
higher than the spreads of non-peripheral countries’ covered bonds. 
Despite the negative impact of the financial and sovereign crises on covered bond markets, 
non-retained issuance remarkably recovered from its post-crisis lows in 2009, reaching 
the highest amount ever in 2011 and subsequently falling in 2012. What’s more, the share 
of covered bonds in global bank debt issuance16 increased in 2010 and 2011 (in parallel to the 
reduction of government guaranteed bonds) as both issuers and investors started to favour 
them over unsecured bonds. 
13  In this section we consider as euro area peripheral countries to Italy, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain. 
14  German issuance’s decline was probably linked to the structural contraction of this market. In fact, German 
Pfandbriefe have traditionally benefited significantly from a wide national investor base in covered bonds.
15  In the second half of 2011, the spread between French and German covered bonds significantly widened as well.
16  Only banks of those countries that have issued at least one covered bond since 2003, according to Dealogic, 
are included in the sample. 
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Additionally, the proportion of covered bonds issued in the euro area has fallen to 45% in 
2012 (80% in 2008). In fact, global decline of issuance in 2012 was largely explained by 
reduced activity in the euro area;17 on the contrary, activity outside the euro area and Nordic 
countries reached the highest yearly amount ever. Indeed, despite the crisis (or perhaps 
because of it) covered bonds have expanded worldwide in parallel to the creation of 
legislative frameworks for these debt instruments around the world. For instance, Australian 
banks were the most important issuers globally in 2012, following the approval of their 
special legislation in 2011. The UK and, afterwards, Canada became important originators 
of these instruments even before their specific national legislations for covered bonds were 
endorsed. Both Australian and Canadian covered bonds attracted investors’ demand that 
looked for safe covered bonds not affected by the sovereign debt crisis. Moreover, Canada, 
followed by Australia and the UK, were the most important issuers of US marketed covered 
bonds in 2012. Although there is still no covered bond legislation in the US, foreign issuers 
have been taking advantage of the growing attention from US investors for these instruments. 
In consequence, this market has increased significantly since 2009 (Chart 4). 
Other characteristics of covered bonds have also changed remarkably during the crisis. 
Euro area covered bonds ratings’ landscape has changed significantly between 2011 and 
2012,18 as a result of the many downgrades of European sovereigns and banks in a period 
when rating methodologies have also been revised. Euro area AAA covered bonds’ issuance 
share fell to the lowest since at least 2003 (72% in 2012). In contrast, AAA issuance of non- 
euro area covered bonds still represented 92% of total issuance. Although it seems that 
investors in euro covered bonds do not rely on ratings so much as in the past, ratings are 
still very relevant when they reach a threshold that could affect, for instance, capital 
charges for banks or their inclusion in certain indices. Regarding maturities,19 average 
maturity for non-euro area countries reached in 2012 its second highest since 2007; 
especially noteworthy was the increase in total issuance of covered bonds above the 10 
year maturity range. For European peripheral countries’, average maturity has been 
steadily decreasing since 2009, recording an important increase of the share of issuances 
with a maturity scope between 1 and 3 years. The average maturity is higher for other euro 
17  An underlying factor of this development was the massive European bank’s participation in the two 3-year 
LTROs, which might have reduced their immediate funding needs and allowed them to access the markets only 
when funding costs were lower.
18  Data not available for the whole sample of covered bonds. 
19  Data regarding maturities until end of 2012.
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area countries and, in this case, covered bonds below 3 years were in 2012 in their lowest 
proportion since at least 2003. 
The investor base in covered bonds is wide and heterogeneous. Main investors in euro 
covered bonds are banks, investment funds, pension funds and insurance companies, 
central banks and residually, hedge funds or corporates. These investors follow different 
rules when valuing covered bonds and focus on different maturities (for instance, insurance 
companies and pension funds prefer longer maturities than banks or central banks) which 
benefits covered bond issuers: In fact, during 2012 new issues were on average 
oversubscribed. Funds and banks continued to be the most important buyers in 2012, 
although pension funds and insurance companies are steadily increasing their share.
Most investors in euro denominated covered bonds are based in Europe, being the German 
the most important buyers followed by French investors [Barclays (2013)]. Furthermore, 
home bias is very relevant for traditional covered bonds issuers, such as Germany, France 
or Iberia (Chart 5). However, this home bias is not so relevant for some non-traditional 
jurisdictions such as the Netherlands, UK and Ireland. Overall, covered bonds with bigger 
domestic bases are considered to be more stable and to withstand better than others 
market volatility [ECBC (2012)]. 
The increasing importance of this funding source at the global level highlighted in the 
previous section has been driven both by cyclical and structural factors. On one hand, 
investors risk aversion is the main driving force in their day-to-day decisions. However, 
there are some structural factors, in particular those related to legal and regulatory changes 
that help to understand these trends in the medium to long term. 
There are some countries which have traditionally promoted this type of debt as a way of 
providing some incentives to the development of alternative sources of mortgage funding 
compared to the traditional models based on securitization (such as the US Government 
Sponsored Entities model, Netherlands or the UK). There are no two identical legislations, 
but they have some important points in common as it is explained below. 
Importantly, in this section an exhaustive revision of national legislations is not presented but 
only those jurisdictions with the biggest mortgage covered bond markets are described 
4  Regulatory context
for covered bond 
markets
4.1  NATIONAL LEGISLATIONS: 
FROM HETEROGENEITY 
TO SOME CONVERGENCE
SOURCE: RBS based on public sources.
a Data until February 21st.
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attending to their main characteristics (Chart 6). In particular, we will consider Spain, Denmark, 
Germany, Sweden, France and Norway. This group of countries have the first legislations in 
this area and, recently, some transformations have been adopted (especially regarding 
transparency) as a way of enhancing the credibility and the quality of this debt instrument.
These amendments of traditional legislations, together with the approval of new covered 
bond frameworks in other countries (such as Australia, Canada and the UK) that are 
reviewed on the second part of this section; conform a trend towards the standardization 
and convergence of national legislative models. However, there are still some important 
differences between national models which are neither trivial nor swiftly to deal with, which 
represent a challenge for the development of a real international covered bond market.
a) Covered bonds as an alternative funding tool for the mortgage market
 Spain, Germany, Denmark, France, Sweden and Norway have the major 
mortgage covered bonds markets globally. Some of them have the oldest 
covered bonds legislations which draw a quite heterogeneous picture (Table 3). 
In general, these countries tended to use a specialized banking model, where 
the activities in which the issuer could engage were restricted (thus, in some 
cases, the issuer and the originator differed). Some countries, such as 
Denmark, Germany and Sweden, have abandoned this specialist banking 
principle and now universal credit institutions (with/without a special license) 
can issue covered bonds. There are other jurisdictions that still keep that 
model. For example, in France, commercial banks can only issue covered 
bonds through the creation of a subsidiary independent of the rest of the 
group (Societes de Credit Foncier and, since 2010, also Sociètes de 
Financement de l’Habitat) dedicated exclusively to the issuance of covered 
bonds named obligations foncières (issuer differs from the originator). The 
same case applies in Norway, where commercial or savings banks are only 
able to issue covered bonds through a mortgage credit institution established 
as a subsidiary. As an exception, Spain is the only jurisdiction where from the 
very beginning all credit institutions that participated in the mortgage market 
(commercial, cooperative and savings banks) can issue covered bonds.
 These legal frameworks were established without direct issuance limits in 
general. Instead, they provided by minimum legal levels of overcollateralization 
with the aim of protecting covered bondholders: 102% in France, Germany and 
MORTGAGE COVERED BONDS OUTSTANDING BY NATIONALITY OF THE ISSUER 2011 CHART 6
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
300 
350 
400 
Spain Denmark Germany Sweden France  United 
Kingdom 
Norway Canada United States Australia Other 
 
 
EUR bln 
    
SOURCE: ECBC (2012).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 79 ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 24
D
at
e
Is
su
er
Is
su
an
ce
 
lim
it
Is
su
er
 s
up
er
vi
so
r
R
in
g-
fe
nc
e 
of
 a
ss
et
s
E
lig
ib
le
 a
ss
et
s
O
ve
r-
co
lla
te
ra
liz
at
io
n 
lim
its
C
ov
er
 p
oo
l m
on
ito
rin
g
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
D
en
m
ar
k
20
07
 (a
).
C
om
m
er
ci
al
 (S
D
O
s)
 a
nd
 
m
or
tg
ag
e 
ba
nk
s 
(S
D
R
O
s)
.
-
H
el
d 
in
 is
su
er
’s
 b
al
an
ce
 
sh
ee
t a
nd
 a
ss
ig
ne
d 
to
 
ca
pi
ta
l c
en
te
rs
 in
 m
or
tg
ag
e 
ba
nk
s 
an
d 
re
gi
st
er
s 
in
 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 b
an
ks
. I
n 
ca
se
 
of
 b
an
kr
up
tc
y,
 a
 tr
us
te
e 
is
 
ap
po
in
te
d 
by
 th
e 
ba
nk
ru
pt
cy
 c
ou
rt
 in
 
m
or
tg
ag
e 
ba
nk
s 
an
d,
 in
 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 b
an
ks
, t
he
 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
or
 w
ill 
be
 in
 
ch
ar
ge
 o
f t
he
 a
ss
et
s.
Lo
an
s 
se
cu
re
d 
by
 r
ea
l 
pr
op
er
ty
 (8
0%
 o
r 
75
%
 m
ax
 
LT
V
); 
ex
po
su
re
s 
to
 p
ub
lic
 
au
th
or
iti
es
 (S
D
R
O
s 
al
so
 
in
cl
ud
e 
ex
po
su
re
s 
to
 c
re
di
t 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 (1
5%
) a
nd
 
co
lla
te
ra
l i
n 
sh
ip
s)
.
10
8%
 m
in
im
um
 c
ov
er
ag
e 
ra
tio
 (m
an
da
to
ry
 fo
r 
m
or
tg
ag
e 
ba
nk
s 
an
d 
no
t f
or
 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 b
an
ks
).
Th
e 
is
su
er
 m
on
ito
rs
 th
e 
co
ve
r 
po
ol
 c
on
tin
uo
us
ly
. 
M
or
tg
ag
e 
ba
nk
s 
- 
in
te
rn
al
 
au
di
to
r.
 C
om
m
er
ci
al
 b
an
ks
 -
 
re
po
rt
 d
ire
ct
ly
 a
nd
 q
ua
rt
er
ly
 
??
???
??
??
??
??
??
???
??
??
??
??
ex
te
rn
al
 a
ud
ito
r).
 Is
su
er
s 
m
us
t p
re
pa
re
 q
ua
rt
er
ly
 
re
po
rt
s 
on
 a
ss
et
-li
ab
ilit
y 
m
an
ag
em
en
t f
or
 th
e 
FS
A
.
In
ve
st
or
 r
ep
or
ts
, t
ra
di
ng
 
ve
nu
es
 a
nd
 in
ve
st
or
 
re
la
tio
ns
 w
eb
si
te
s.
 D
an
is
h 
na
tio
na
l t
ra
ns
pa
re
nc
y 
te
m
pl
at
e 
(c
om
pl
em
en
ts
 th
e 
E
C
B
C
 la
be
l).
D
an
is
h 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l S
up
er
vi
so
ry
 
A
ut
ho
rit
y.
Fr
an
ce
O
bl
ig
at
io
ns
 fo
nc
iè
re
s 
- 
O
F 
(1
99
9)
 &
   
   
  
O
bl
ig
at
io
ns
 th
e 
Fi
na
nc
em
en
t  
de
 l’
H
ab
ita
t 
- 
O
H
(2
01
0/
11
).
S
pe
ci
al
is
t c
re
di
t 
in
st
itu
tio
n 
- 
S
oc
iè
te
s 
de
 
cr
éd
it 
fo
nc
ie
r 
(S
C
F)
 a
nd
 
S
oc
iè
te
s 
de
 
Fi
na
nc
em
en
t d
e 
l’H
ab
ita
t (
S
FH
).
-
H
el
d 
in
 th
e 
is
su
er
’s
 b
al
an
ce
 
sh
ee
t. 
S
C
Fs
 a
nd
 S
FH
s 
ar
e 
to
ta
lly
 b
an
kr
up
tc
y 
re
m
ot
e.
 
O
F 
- 
Fi
rs
t-
ra
nk
 r
es
id
en
tia
l 
an
d 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 m
or
tg
ag
es
 
(m
ax
 L
TV
 8
0%
); 
st
at
e 
an
d 
th
ird
 p
ar
ty
 g
ua
ra
nt
ee
d 
re
al
-
es
ta
te
 lo
an
s;
 p
ub
lic
 s
ec
to
r 
ex
po
su
re
s;
 s
ec
ur
iti
za
tio
n 
of
 
th
e 
ab
ov
e.
 O
H
 -
 R
es
id
en
tia
l 
m
or
tg
ag
es
 a
nd
 
se
cu
rit
iz
at
io
n 
of
 th
em
.
10
2%
 m
in
im
um
 c
ov
er
ag
e 
ra
tio
.
??
??
???
??
??
???
???
??
ap
po
in
te
d 
by
 th
e 
S
C
F/
S
FH
 
an
d 
ag
re
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
su
pe
rv
is
or
y 
au
th
or
ity
. 
D
ut
ie
s:
 c
on
tr
ol
 e
lig
ib
ilit
y,
 
co
m
po
si
tio
n 
an
d 
va
lu
at
io
n 
of
 a
ss
et
s;
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
ith
 
m
in
im
um
 c
ov
er
ag
e 
ra
tio
 
(q
ua
rt
er
ly
 r
ep
or
t);
 c
on
tr
ol
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t o
f r
is
ks
 o
n 
as
se
ts
 (l
iq
ui
di
ty
, i
nt
er
es
t 
ra
te
, c
ur
re
nc
y 
an
d 
m
at
ur
ity
 
m
is
m
at
ch
 r
is
ks
).
S
C
Fs
/S
FH
s 
sh
ou
ld
 is
su
e 
??
???
??
??
??
??
??
??
???
??
??
??
??
??
(q
ua
rt
er
ly
 a
ss
et
 r
ep
or
t, 
se
m
i-
an
nu
al
 r
ep
or
t o
n 
co
ve
ra
ge
 
ra
tio
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
lim
its
, a
nu
al
 r
ep
or
ts
 o
n 
as
se
ts
 a
nd
 m
et
ho
ds
 o
f 
va
lu
at
io
n 
an
d 
a 
re
po
rt
 o
n 
ris
k 
m
an
ag
em
en
t).
Fr
en
ch
 b
an
ki
ng
 s
up
er
vi
so
ry
 
au
th
or
ity
.
G
er
m
an
y
20
05
.
U
ni
ve
rs
al
 c
re
di
t 
in
st
itu
tio
n 
w
ith
 a
n 
sp
ec
ia
l l
ic
en
se
.
-
H
el
d 
in
 th
e 
is
su
er
’s
 b
al
an
ce
 
sh
ee
t. 
C
ov
er
 a
ss
et
s 
(re
co
rd
ed
 in
 th
e 
co
ve
r 
re
gi
st
er
) a
re
 e
xc
lu
de
d 
fro
m
 
th
e 
in
so
lv
en
cy
 s
ta
te
 (c
ov
er
 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
or
, p
ro
po
se
d 
by
 
B
aF
in
 a
nd
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 b
y 
co
ur
t).
M
or
tg
ag
es
, p
ub
lic
 s
ec
to
r 
lo
an
s,
 s
hi
p,
 a
irc
ra
ft 
(m
ax
 
LT
V
 6
0%
 fo
r 
al
l).
 C
re
di
t 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 e
xp
os
ur
es
 (m
ax
 
10
%
 n
om
in
al
 v
al
ue
 o
f t
he
 
bo
nd
), 
de
riv
at
iv
es
 (m
ax
 1
2%
 
of
 c
ov
er
 a
ss
et
s)
.
10
2%
 m
in
im
um
 c
ov
er
ag
e 
ra
tio
.
C
e?
???
??
??
??
???
???
??
??
??
??
?
by
 B
aF
in
. B
aF
in
 m
us
t 
m
on
ito
r 
th
e 
co
ve
r 
po
ol
 o
n 
av
er
ag
e 
ev
er
y 
2 
ye
ar
s.
 
P
fa
nd
bi
er
db
an
ks
 m
us
t c
ar
ry
 
w
ee
kl
y 
ov
er
 c
ol
la
te
ra
liz
at
io
n 
st
re
ss
 te
st
s 
&
 d
ai
ly
 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
n 
of
 1
80
-d
ay
. 
Le
ga
l r
eq
.: 
Q
ua
rt
er
ly
 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f C
B
s 
ou
ts
ta
nd
in
g 
an
d 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s.
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t t
he
 le
ga
l s
tr
uc
tu
re
. 
P
riv
at
e 
re
q.
: v
dp
 
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 In
iti
at
iv
e 
20
10
.
B
aF
in
, G
er
m
an
 F
ed
er
al
 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l S
up
er
vi
so
ry
 
A
ut
ho
rit
y.
C
ov
er
 p
oo
l c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
C
O
V
E
R
E
D
 B
O
N
D
S
 A
S
 A
N
 A
LT
E
R
N
A
T
IV
E
 T
O
O
L 
T
O
 F
IN
A
N
C
E
 T
H
E
 M
O
R
T
G
A
G
E
 M
A
R
K
E
T 
TA
B
LE
 3
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 80 ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 24
S
O
U
R
C
E
: E
C
B
C
. T
hi
s 
ta
bl
e 
de
sc
rib
es
 th
e 
m
ai
n 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s 
of
 e
ac
h 
le
ga
l f
ra
m
ew
or
k 
as
 o
f J
an
ua
ry
 2
01
3.
a 
Tr
ad
iti
on
al
ly
, m
or
tg
ag
e 
ba
nk
s 
is
su
ed
 m
or
tg
ag
e 
bo
nd
s 
(R
ea
lk
re
di
to
bl
ig
at
io
ne
r,
 R
O
s)
. T
he
 D
an
is
h 
A
ct
 o
n 
co
ve
re
d 
bo
nd
s 
of
 2
00
7 
in
tro
du
ce
d 
tw
o 
ne
w
 in
st
ru
m
en
ts
: S
æ
rli
gt
 R
ea
lk
re
di
to
bl
ig
at
io
ne
r 
(S
D
R
O
s)
 e
xc
lu
si
ve
ly
 is
su
ed
 b
y 
m
or
tg
ag
e 
ba
nk
s 
an
d 
S
æ
rli
gt
 D
æ
kk
ed
e 
O
bl
ig
at
io
ne
r (
S
D
O
) i
ss
ue
d 
by
 m
or
tg
ag
e 
an
d 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 b
an
ks
. A
ll 
R
O
s 
is
su
ed
 b
ef
or
e 
1/
1/
20
08
 h
av
e 
m
ai
nt
ai
ne
d 
th
ei
r c
ov
er
ed
 b
on
d 
st
at
us
 (1
0%
 ri
sk
 w
ei
gh
t i
ns
te
ad
 o
f 2
0%
) i
n 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
ith
 th
e 
gr
an
df
at
he
rin
g 
op
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
ap
ita
l R
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 D
ire
ct
iv
e 
(th
e 
on
ly
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
R
O
s 
an
d 
S
D
R
O
s 
is
 th
at
 L
TV
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
is
 o
nl
y 
re
qu
ire
d 
at
 d
is
bu
rs
em
en
t o
f t
he
 lo
an
 in
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f R
O
s 
an
d 
no
t d
ur
in
g 
al
l t
he
 te
rm
 o
f t
he
 lo
an
 a
s 
in
 S
D
R
O
s)
.
b
 
In
 o
rd
er
 to
 o
bt
ai
n 
th
e 
sp
ec
ia
l l
ic
en
se
 o
ne
 r
eq
ui
re
m
en
t i
s 
th
e 
co
nv
er
si
on
 o
f o
ut
st
an
di
ng
 m
or
tg
ag
e 
bo
nd
s 
in
 c
ov
er
ed
 b
on
ds
, s
o 
m
os
t S
w
ed
is
h 
m
or
tg
ag
e 
bo
nd
s 
is
su
ed
 b
ef
or
e 
ha
ve
 n
ow
 th
e 
st
at
us
 o
f c
ov
er
ed
 b
on
ds
.
D
at
e
Is
su
er
Is
su
an
ce
 
lim
it
Is
su
er
 s
up
er
vi
so
r
R
in
g-
fe
nc
e 
of
 a
ss
et
s
E
lig
ib
le
 a
ss
et
s
O
ve
r-
co
lla
te
ra
liz
at
io
n 
lim
its
C
ov
er
 p
oo
l m
on
ito
rin
g
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
N
or
w
ay
20
07
.
S
pe
ci
al
iz
ed
 m
or
tg
ag
e 
 
cr
ed
it 
in
st
itu
tio
n.
-
H
el
d 
in
 th
e 
is
su
er
’s
 b
al
an
ce
 
sh
ee
t. 
A
n 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
or
 is
 
ap
po
in
te
d 
by
 c
ou
rt
 in
 c
as
e 
of
 b
an
kr
up
tc
y 
of
 th
e 
is
su
er
.
R
es
id
en
tia
l (
m
ax
 L
TV
 7
5%
) 
an
d 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 m
or
tg
ag
es
 
(m
ax
 L
TV
 6
0%
); 
pu
bl
ic
 
se
ct
or
 lo
an
s;
 d
er
iv
at
iv
e 
ag
re
em
en
ts
; s
ub
st
itu
te
 
as
se
ts
.
10
0%
 m
in
im
um
 c
ov
er
ag
e 
ra
tio
 (i
ss
ue
r 
ca
n 
es
ta
bl
is
h 
a 
le
ve
l a
bo
ve
 th
is
 o
ne
). 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 b
y 
FS
A
. D
ut
ie
s:
 c
on
tr
ol
 r
eg
is
te
r 
of
 C
B
s 
an
d 
co
ve
r 
as
se
ts
; 
an
d 
ba
la
nc
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
e 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e.
 R
ep
or
ts
 
an
nu
al
ly
 to
 th
e 
FS
A
 (o
r 
w
he
ne
ve
r 
th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e)
.
Th
e 
is
su
er
 a
nd
 th
e 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t i
ns
pe
ct
or
 
re
po
rt
 p
er
io
di
ca
lly
 to
 th
e 
su
pe
rv
is
or
. 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l S
up
er
vi
so
ry
 
A
ut
ho
rit
y 
of
 N
or
w
ay
 (F
S
A
).
S
pa
in
19
81
 
??
??
???
??
??
??
??
??
&
 2
00
9)
.
C
re
di
t i
ns
tit
ut
io
ns
 
en
tit
le
d 
to
 p
ar
tic
ip
at
e 
in
 
th
e 
m
or
tg
ag
e 
m
ar
ke
t 
(tr
ad
iti
on
al
ly
 c
om
m
er
ci
al
, 
co
op
er
at
iv
e 
an
d 
sa
vi
ng
s 
ba
nk
s)
.
-
H
el
d 
in
 th
e 
is
su
er
’s
 b
al
an
ce
 
sh
ee
t. 
Is
su
er
 m
us
t k
ee
p 
a 
sp
ec
ia
l a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
co
ve
r 
as
se
t r
eg
is
te
r.
 C
B
 h
ol
de
rs
 
ha
ve
 p
re
fe
re
nt
ia
l c
la
im
 
ag
ai
ns
t t
he
 in
so
lv
en
cy
 
es
ta
te
. I
ns
ol
ve
nc
y 
bo
dy
 
sa
m
e 
as
 fo
r 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
.
C
éd
ul
as
 H
ip
ot
ec
ar
ia
s(
C
H
): 
se
cu
re
d 
by
 th
e 
en
tir
e 
m
or
tg
ag
e 
lo
an
 b
oo
k 
(e
xc
lu
di
ng
 s
ec
ur
iti
za
tio
ns
 o
r 
lo
an
s 
se
cu
rin
g 
m
or
tg
ag
e 
bo
nd
s)
. 
12
5%
 fo
r 
C
H
. 1
43
%
 fo
r 
C
éd
ul
as
 T
er
rit
or
ia
le
s 
(C
H
 
w
ho
se
 c
ov
er
 a
ss
et
s 
ar
e 
pu
bl
ic
 a
dm
in
is
tr
at
io
ns
 
ex
po
su
re
s)
.
Is
su
er
 m
us
t m
on
ito
r 
th
e 
co
ve
r 
po
ol
 (a
s 
pa
rt
 o
f i
ts
 r
is
k 
m
an
ag
em
en
t a
nd
 a
ud
iti
ng
). 
M
on
th
ly
 C
B
 r
ep
or
t t
o 
th
e 
B
an
k 
of
 S
pa
in
. A
nn
ua
l 
ac
co
un
ts
 c
on
ta
in
 th
e 
de
ta
ils
 
of
 th
e 
re
gi
st
er
 o
f l
oa
ns
. 
N
at
io
na
l t
ra
ns
pa
re
nc
y 
te
m
pl
at
e 
co
ns
is
te
nt
 w
ith
 
E
C
B
C
 la
be
l.
B
an
k 
of
 S
pa
in
.
S
w
ed
en
20
04
 (b
).
C
re
di
t i
ns
tit
ut
io
ns
 w
ith
 a
 
sp
ec
ia
l l
ic
en
se
.
-
H
el
d 
in
 th
e 
is
su
er
’s
 b
al
an
ce
 
sh
ee
t. 
Th
e 
is
su
er
 m
us
t k
ee
p 
a 
co
ve
r 
po
ol
 r
eg
is
te
r.
 In
 
ca
se
 o
f i
ns
ol
ve
nc
y,
 
re
gi
st
er
ed
 c
ov
er
 a
ss
et
s 
an
d 
C
B
s 
ar
e 
se
gr
eg
at
ed
 fr
om
 
th
e 
ge
ne
ra
l i
ns
ol
ve
nc
y 
es
ta
te
. 
R
es
id
en
tia
l (
m
ax
 L
TV
 7
5%
) 
an
d 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 (m
ax
 L
TV
 
60
%
, m
ax
 1
0%
 o
f c
ov
er
 
po
ol
) m
or
tg
ag
es
; p
ub
lic
 
se
ct
or
 a
ss
et
s;
 s
ub
st
itu
te
 
as
se
ts
.
10
2%
 m
in
im
um
 c
ov
er
ag
e 
ra
tio
In
de
pe
nd
en
t c
ov
er
 p
oo
l 
tr
us
te
e 
(a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
S
FS
A
). 
D
ut
ie
s:
 m
on
ito
r 
th
e 
re
gi
st
er
 a
nd
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
ith
 m
ar
ke
t a
nd
 m
ar
ch
in
g 
ris
ks
. I
t m
us
t s
ub
m
it 
an
 
an
nu
al
 r
ep
or
t t
o 
th
e 
S
FS
A
.
Q
ua
rt
er
ly
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t 
th
e 
co
ve
r 
po
ol
 a
nd
 
ou
ts
ta
nd
in
g 
C
B
s 
(is
su
er
 
w
eb
si
te
). 
S
te
ps
 to
w
ar
d 
na
tio
na
l t
ra
ns
pa
re
nc
y 
te
m
pl
at
e.
S
w
ed
is
h 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l 
S
up
er
vi
so
ry
 A
ut
ho
rit
y 
(S
FS
A
).
C
ov
er
 p
oo
l c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
C
O
V
E
R
E
D
 B
O
N
D
S
 A
S
 A
N
 A
LT
E
R
N
A
T
IV
E
 T
O
O
L 
T
O
 F
IN
A
N
C
E
 T
H
E
 M
O
R
T
G
A
G
E
 M
A
R
K
E
T
 (c
on
t.
) 
TA
B
LE
 3
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 81 ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 24
Sweden, 108% for mortgage banks in Denmark. In the case of Norway the 
minimum coverage ratio equals 100%, although issuers can voluntarily 
establish a certain level above this one. For Spanish covered bonds (cédulas 
hipotecarias) the minimum level of overcollateralization is 125% which is 
guaranteed by the fact that credit institutions are not allowed by law to issue 
more than 80% of total eligible assets (given that covered bonds are secured 
not only by eligible assets but by the entire mortgage loan book by Spanish law, 
the cap on issuance could be interpreted as a minimum level of collateralization). 
 Apart from these minimum coverage ratios, there are some requirements that 
enhance the quality of assets eligible as collateral such as loan-to-value 
limits,20 geographical limitations for cover assets (for example, in Germany 
only loans originated in EU/EEA countries, Switzerland, USA, Canada and 
Japan are eligible for the cover pool), caps on the proportion of some specific 
assets in the cover pool and requirements over eligible substitute assets.
 Typically, under these legal frameworks the cover pool remains on the issuer’s 
balance sheet and a special register must be kept by the issuer by law, 
identifying cover assets and matching them with their respective cover pools. 
Under these legislations covered bondholders have a preferential right over the 
cover pool and also a claim against the issuer pari passu with the rest of bond 
holders, as it is usual for these debt securities (in those jurisdictions where the 
specialist banking principle applies, France and Norway, the claim is established 
also against the issuer and not against the originator21). The cover pool register 
attempts to ease the segregation of these assets from the insolvency estate, 
thus helping to isolate the credit rating of the cover pool from that of the 
issuer. In some countries, such as Germany and Denmark, the cover pool is 
managed by a special administrator/trustee who protects the interests of 
covered bondholders. In the case of Spain, where the entire mortgage loan 
book serves as collateral for its covered bonds, there is neither a special 
register requirement nor segregation of assets in case of insolvency.
 Regarding the monitoring of the cover pool, in most of these jurisdictions 
there exists an independent monitor generally appointed (or, at least, agreed) 
by the national supervisor of the issuer. This independent monitor is named in 
order to check regularly whether assets in the cover pool comply with legal 
requirements (the toughness of these controls differs across countries) thus 
the evolution of the eligible asset pool is linked to the one of house prices. 
Alternatively, in the cases of Denmark and Spain there are no independent 
cover pool monitors, it is the issuer of covered bonds who is in charge of this 
duty. Differences in this area could contribute to explain the heterogeneity in 
the levels of overcollateralization (Table 3). 
 Finally, although there are some initiatives being developed in order to achieve 
larger consistency and homogeneity (such as the European Covered Bond 
20  In most jurisdictions larger loans might be included although the excess of the maximum LTV is excluded from 
the cover pool [ECBC (2012), Packer et al. (2007)].
21  Danske Markets (2011). In the case of France, if the parent company is a going concern and the specialist 
subsidiary that issues covered bonds (SCF or SFH) enters into bankruptcy, the French banking regulators may 
exert pressure on the holding company to provide support (by law, there is no further claim against the parent 
bank if cover assets prove insufficient). 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 82 ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 24
S
O
U
R
C
E
: E
C
B
C
, C
an
ad
a 
M
or
tg
ag
e 
an
d 
H
ou
si
ng
 C
or
po
ra
tio
n.
 T
hi
s 
ta
bl
e 
de
sc
rib
es
 th
e 
m
ai
n 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s 
of
 e
ac
h 
le
ga
l f
ra
m
ew
or
k 
as
 o
f J
an
ua
ry
 2
01
3.
a 
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
???
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
???
??
??
???
??
??
???
???
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
???
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
???
???
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
????
???
??
??
???
??
?
??
??
??
???
??
??
??
??
??
??
???
???
??
??
??
??
???
??
???
???
??
???
??
???
b
 
??
??
???
??
??
??
???
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
???
???
??
??
??
?
??
??
?
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
?
??
???
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
????
??
??
??
c 
M
or
eo
ve
r,
 th
e 
B
oE
 p
ub
lis
he
d 
in
 N
ov
em
be
r 
20
10
 e
le
gi
bi
lit
y 
cr
ite
ria
 fo
r 
its
 c
ov
er
ed
 b
on
ds
’ s
ch
em
es
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
pr
ov
is
io
n 
of
 lo
an
 le
ve
l d
at
a,
 p
ub
lic
at
io
n 
of
 tr
an
sa
ct
io
n 
do
cu
m
en
ta
tio
n,
 h
om
og
en
ei
ze
d 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
n 
su
m
m
ar
ie
s 
an
d 
st
an
da
rd
is
ed
 
in
ve
st
or
 r
ep
or
tin
g,
 w
hi
ch
 a
dd
s 
to
 th
e 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
in
 p
la
ce
.
D
at
e
??
??
er
??
??
an
ce
 li
m
it
??
??
er
 s
up
er
vi
so
r
R
in
g-
fe
nc
e 
of
 a
ss
et
s
E
lig
ib
le
 a
ss
et
s
O
ve
r-
co
lla
te
ra
liz
at
io
n 
lim
its
C
ov
er
 p
oo
l m
on
ito
rin
g
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
??
??a
lia
20
11
.
??
??
??
??
ed
 d
ep
os
it-
ta
ki
ng
 in
st
itu
tio
n.
??
??
???
??
??
???
?
??
??
?a
lia
n 
as
se
ts
.  
   
   
   
   
   
  
H
el
d 
in
 a
n 
in
so
lv
en
cy
 
re
m
ot
e 
S
P
V
 (C
B
s 
re
m
ai
n 
as
 
di
re
ct
, u
nc
on
di
tio
na
l 
ob
lig
at
io
ns
 o
f t
he
 is
su
er
).
R
es
id
en
tia
l m
or
tg
ag
es
 
(m
ax
 L
T?
??
??
???
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 m
or
tg
ag
es
 (m
ax
 
??
??
??
?
???
??
??
??
??
?c
to
r 
ex
po
su
re
s,
 c
re
di
t 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 e
xp
os
ur
es
.
??
??
??
??
??
??
?c
ov
er
ag
e 
ra
tio
.
??
??
??
???
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
???
D
ut
ie
s:
 a
ss
es
s 
re
gi
st
er
, 
qu
al
ity
 a
nd
 n
at
ur
e 
of
 c
ov
er
 
a?
??
??
???
??
?e
r 
du
tie
s:
 
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
ov
er
ag
e 
??
??
???
?
??
???
??
??
??
??
??
??
?
??
???
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
M
on
th
ly
 C
B
 r
ep
or
ts
 a
gr
ee
d 
by
 th
e 
m
ai
n 
ba
nk
s.
 
C
on
ta
in
s:
 p
ro
gr
am
 r
at
in
g,
 
??
??
???
??
???
?
??
??
?
??
ou
ts
ta
nd
in
g 
an
d 
co
ve
r 
po
ol
 
su
m
m
ar
y 
ta
bl
es
.
??
??
??
???
??
??
??
??
???
??
R
e?
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
???
?
C
an
ad
a
20
12
 (a
).
R
eg
ul
at
ed
 C
an
ad
ia
n 
??
an
ci
al
 in
st
itu
tio
ns
.
??
??
???
a?
??
??
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s.
H
el
d 
in
 a
n 
in
so
lv
en
cy
 
re
m
ot
e 
S
P
V
 
(th
e 
G
ua
ra
nt
or
). 
U
ni
ns
ur
ed
 r
es
id
en
tia
l 
m
or
tg
ag
es
 fo
r 
C
an
ad
ia
n 
pr
op
er
tie
s 
(n
o 
m
or
e 
th
an
 
fo
ur
 u
ni
t r
es
id
en
tia
l u
ni
ts
) 
(m
ax
 L
T?
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
?
??
??e
st
ab
lis
h 
a 
m
in
im
um
 a
nd
 m
ax
im
um
 
un
de
r 
th
ei
r 
pr
og
ra
m
s.
??
??
??
???
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
is
su
e?
???
??
??
??
??
??
??
?
C
ov
er
ag
??
??
??
???
?
??
?
P
ub
lic
 O
ffe
rin
g 
D
oc
um
en
t. 
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
???
??
T 
re
su
lts
).
C
an
ad
a 
M
or
tg
ag
e 
an
d 
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
???
??
(re
??
???
???
??
??
??
??
???
??
?
??
??
???
??
??
??
???
???
??
??
??
al
 
??
??
???
???
??
??
U
ni
te
d 
K
in
gd
om
20
08
 
(a
m
en
de
d 
in
 2
01
1)
.
D
ep
os
it-
ta
ki
ng
 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 
he
ad
qu
ar
te
re
d 
in
 th
e 
U
K
.
C
as
e-
by
-c
as
e 
(a
gr
ee
d 
be
tw
ee
n 
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
(b
).
H
el
d 
by
 a
 S
pe
ci
al
 P
ur
po
se
 
V
eh
ic
le
 (C
B
s 
re
m
ai
n 
as
 
di
re
ct
, u
nc
on
di
tio
na
l 
ob
lig
at
io
ns
 o
f t
he
 is
su
er
. 
?
??
??
???
??
??
??
??
??
??
?
??
??
??
?
th
e 
is
su
er
’s
 b
al
an
ce
 s
he
et
).
R
es
id
en
tia
l (
m
ax
 L
TV
 8
??
??
an
d 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 m
or
tg
ag
es
; 
pu
bl
ic
 s
ec
to
r 
ex
po
su
re
s.
 
??
??
??
??
??
??
?c
ov
er
ag
e 
ra
tio
 (s
in
ce
 1
 J
an
ua
ry
 2
01
3)
.
??
??
er
 is
 r
es
po
ns
ib
le
 o
f 
?
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
e 
Te
st
. S
in
ce
 1
 J
an
ua
ry
 
20
13
 a
n 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
??
??
???
??
???
??
???
???
??
??
??
be
 n
am
ed
, w
hi
ch
 m
us
t 
co
nd
uc
t s
em
ia
nn
ua
l 
in
sp
ec
tio
ns
, a
nn
ua
l r
ev
ie
w
 
??
??
?
??
??
??
??
??
???
??
??
al
ly
 
??
???
??
??
??
??
??
er
s 
ar
e 
re
qu
ire
d 
to
 
re
po
rt
 d
et
ai
le
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
??
???
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
??
an
ua
ry
 
20
13
 n
ew
 r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 
in
tr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
H
M
T 
(lo
an
 
le
ve
l d
at
a 
an
d 
ot
he
r 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
) 
(c
).
??
?a
nc
ia
l C
on
du
ct
 
??
??
??
???
???
?
??
?
C
ov
er
 p
oo
l c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
C
O
V
E
R
E
D
 B
O
N
D
S
 A
S
 A
 B
A
N
K
 F
U
N
D
IN
G
 D
IV
E
R
S
IF
IC
A
T
IO
N
 T
O
O
L 
TA
B
LE
 4
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 83 ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 24
Council (ECBC) covered bond label initiative, see Section 4.3), transparency is 
one of the characteristics that present more discrepancies among jurisdictions 
(Table 3 describes transparency characteristics in different countries).
b) Covered bonds as a diversifying bank funding tool
 Covered bond markets in the UK and Canada have been developed through 
private contractual agreements (structured covered bonds) until the introduction 
of their respective recent national legislations. Australia is an additional example 
where covered bonds have just started to develop. These new legislations are 
aimed at providing a legal and homogeneous framework for covered bond 
issuance and, in general, are constructed with the objective of incentivizing 
bank funding diversification for all credit institutions. Moreover, these new 
frameworks do not follow the specialized banking model but all banking 
institutions are allowed to issue covered bonds (Table 4). At the same time, in 
order to guarantee the diversification of bank funding and avoid an increased 
concentration in this market segment, new legislations try to avoid the detriment 
to other (unsecured) sources of funding (such as unsecured senior debt or 
depositors) protecting them through the establishment of limits on issuance. 
This is one of the main differences between these new frameworks and the ones 
presented above. These limits are fixed attending to the proportion of covered 
bonds with respect to total assets of the issuing institution (in the case of the 
UK, it is established case-by-case by the UK Financial Conduct Authority).
 Regarding the cover pool, under new legislations assets are held in a separate 
Special Purpose Vehicle in order to assure its insolvency remoteness. 
However, one important difference between this model and the one established 
in the ones presented before (such as France or Norway) is that the issuer is 
also the originator of the assets and covered bonds are its direct, unconditional 
obligations. Thus claims against the originator for covered bond holders 
remain in place. These frameworks also introduce requirements on the quality 
and nature of assets to be included in the cover pool, as well as a minimum 
over collateralization requirement (with the exception of Canada, where 
issuers must establish the minimum and maximum coverage ratios). 
 Regarding monitoring of the cover pool, in all of these jurisdictions an 
independent asset pool monitor is named and the issuer also has some 
monitoring duties that should satisfy. All of them include a regular asset coverage 
test that assures the quality and sufficiency of the cover pool of assets. Finally, 
these legislations already include provisions regarding transparency that draw a 
more homogeneous picture compared to those presented before. 
The characteristics of covered bonds (double recourse, mortgage collateralization and 
long term maturity) explain why these instruments traditionally benefit from a favourable 
treatment both in capital regulation and as collateral in monetary policy operations. The 
global financial crisis has produced an intense revision of most of the regulatory framework, 
developing new regulatory topics (such as those related with liquidity risk and bail-in 
policies) and reviewing previous rules (capital, monetary policy framework or transparency). 
Overall, regulatory changes tend to be positive for covered bond markets although some 
initiatives could also have negative consequences for specific aspects or jurisdictions. 
Moreover, an important part of these amendments depend on the development at the 
4.2  INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATORY CHANGES 
RELEVANT FOR COVERED 
BONDS
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national level of international agreements, so the final configuration is still uncertain. For a 
matter of simplicity, this section focuses mainly on the initiatives taken by European 
authorities that are more relevant for the main covered bond issuers.
a) Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) and transparency rules
 European authorities introduced MiFID in 2004 in order to improve transparency 
and adequate the commercialization in equity markets. In October 2011, the 
European Commission published the MiFID 2 and the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Regulation (MiFIR), which are the basic regulations that broad the 
scope of MiFID and include, among other fixed income products, covered 
bonds. The consequence of these regulations mainly referred to pre-traded 
and post-traded requirements in secondary markets, and incentives to traded 
covered bonds on regulated markets or multilateral platforms. The final 
purposes of these new regulations are increasing liquidity and promoting 
transparency, something that, a priori, should positive. However, liquidity on 
secondary covered bond market traditionally has been reduced due to factors 
that will not be addressed by the MiFID such as the lack of harmonization on 
jurisdictions or the prevalence of investors that hold covered bonds to maturity. 
Industry participants therefore argue that these new proposals could be 
counterproductive reducing the number of trades due to the additional cost of 
improving transparency and damaging liquidity on secondary markets.
 Apart from these regulatory changes, several private initiatives had been 
developed to promote higher standardization on disclosure practices. One of 
the most relevant is the ECBC covered bond label that improves access to 
information for investors, regulators and other market participants. In this case, 
this label has been backed by the ECB recognizing it in its collateral framework. 
Alternatively to this initiative from the issuers, the Covered Bond Investor Council 
(CBIC) has launched a European standards transparency template that contains 
key information which investors required to make well informed decisions. 
b) Capital regulation
 Investment in covered bonds has been traditionally implied less capital 
requirements than senior unsecured debt or securitization. European regulation 
in this area is contained in the Capital Requirement Directive (CRD). The new 
CRDIV includes significant improvement for the treatment of covered bonds by 
reducing their risk weighting. Moreover the preliminary draft of Solvency II (the 
basic capital regulation for insurance companies) also contains a beneficial 
treatment for investment in these instruments. It should be noted that, interestingly, 
the capital treatment under the CRDIV is linked to transparency from issuers. 
c) Liquidity regulation
 Liquidity risk was one of the features taken into account by the Basel III 
framework by means of what is called the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). 
European authorities will implement LCR trough the CRDIV. This ratio tries to 
ensure that banks have an adequate stock of unencumbered high quality 
liquid assets (HQLA) which can be converted into cash to meet its liquidity 
needs for a 30 calendar day liquidity stress scenario. The LCR considers two 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 85 ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 24
kinds of HQLA, level 1 (compute without any restriction) and level 2 assets 
(could not account for more than 40% of HQLA and are subject to a range of 
haircuts). High rated covered bonds will be the only claim against private 
banking sector that could compute for LCR and will be consider in Basel III 
rule as a level 2 asset (with a haircut of 15%). 
d) Recovery and resolution framework
 In order to reduce the implicit public subsidy for financial institutions and ending 
too-big-to-fail firms, authorities are discussing new regulations to improve the 
recovery and resolution framework for financial institutions (most of these 
regulatory changes are being coordinated internationally). In particular, 
European lawmakers are finalizing the legislative process for the bank resolution 
directive. It is not straightforward to summarize the impact on covered bond 
markets of these new regulations since similar resolution and recovery rules 
could have different implications depending on the specificities of national 
legislations. Moreover, an increasing number of countries are introducing 
changes in their bank resolution legislations that contain significant differences 
that might have to be reviewed once international agreements are reached.
 One of the first consequences of recovery and resolution regimes is the 
possible existence of a substitution effect between debt instruments as senior 
unsecured debt becomes more prone to suffer losses (either by bail-in tools 
or through liquidation procedures) than covered bonds.22 On the other hand, 
covered bond pools could be negatively affected by these bail-in provisions 
since senior debt is eligible as a substitute asset for the dynamic cover pool 
in most national legislations.
 Another area which might affect covered bonds could be the resolution 
powers that allow the transferring of assets to bridge or bad banks. In this 
case some recent changes in legislations (France, Netherland or Spain) could 
permit that this power affects assets pledged to covered bond holders; 
however in other cases (Germany, Ireland or UK) similar changes has been 
introduced but with some clauses that exempt covered bonds pools from 
such possibility. Recent episodes of liquidation or nationalization in Cyprus, 
Netherlands or Spain suggest that, under these circumstances, authorities 
make use of several tools to protect covered bond holders.
 Finally, the possibility to include deposit preference in the resolution regime 
could induce some inconsistency with covered bond legislation. This could 
be illustrated by the US discussion around the long awaited covered bond 
legislation. The US is one of the few countries with an explicit depositor 
preference regime; in this case the guarantor of depositors – the Financial 
Depositors Insurance Company (FDIC) – is against the introduction of a 
standard covered bond legislation on the basis that is inconsistent with 
deposit preference given that in case of liquidation covered bond holders 
maintain an over collateralized pool until maturity, something that limits the 
flexibility of the FDIC to preserve depositors interests (Krimminger 2010). 
22  One notable exception is the recently approved Dutch legislation (2012), which does not exclude covered 
bonds from bail in interventions. 
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Covered bond markets were traditionally more focused at the domestic level but their 
recent expansion, both geographically and in terms of size, have resulted in the 
emergence of a new globalized debt market. Not only demand has increased due to 
cyclical factors (risk aversion as a result of financial and sovereign debt crises or the 
higher yields they provide compared to public bonds), but there are some structural 
determinants that are increasing investors’ appetite such as the favourable regulatory 
treatment of these debt securities. On the other hand, the supply is also growing with the 
emergence of new national covered bond legislations are entering into force and the 
older ones are being amended homogenizing this product across jurisdictions and 
opening the market to new issuers (as the specialist banking principle is being abandoned 
in some jurisdictions). 
Under this new environment, adaptation of the structure of the covered bond market might 
be crucial in order to assure its development. The lack of harmonization between different 
legislations and the limited transparency of these instruments might be affecting or slowing 
down the growth of this market (especially in those jurisdictions with relatively more 
peculiarities). In this context, there are several initiatives aimed at enhancing disclosure, 
such as private sector initiatives to create homogeneous templates for public disclosure of 
covered bond information, promoted both by issuers (European covered bond label) and 
investors (CBIC European Transparency standards). Other alternative might be the 
strengthening and further development of market making commitments and impositions of 
minimum threshold issuance size (such as Jumbo covered bonds). Finally, the establishment 
of centralized institutions to operate in the market on behalf of covered bond issuers might 
also be considered. For example, French Caisse de Refinancement de L’Habitat (CRH) is 
an example of a company established independently23 of the borrowing banks, which 
issues covered bonds in order to finance mortgage loans of these banks under a specific 
regulatory context. Nowadays, the size of covered bonds outstanding of CRH is quite 
important, they are very liquid, listed on MTS (electronic trading platform) and several 
banks are market markers of them [ECBC (2012)]. Notwithstanding these initiatives, 
fundamental liquidity in the covered bond market might be relatively lower compared to 
other markets. Given the characteristics of these bonds, the typical investors’ base is in 
general relatively more risk averse compared to other markets and more focused in hold-
to-maturity strategies reducing secondary market activity. 
From a financial stability point of view, the treatment of these bonds in a new world that 
try to establish a framework where financial institutions could be resolved is one of the 
aspects that might have direct effects on the future configuration of the covered bond 
market. As is has been previously highlighted, covered bonds have some qualities that 
might create externalities for other unsecured creditors such as depositors or senior 
debt [Anand et al. (2012)]. In this context, the clarification of the reach of covered bond 
holders’ statutory claims during resolution processes might be crucial investment 
decisions of economic agents in the market. In some countries that have adopted 
recently new legislations, where the covered bond market is being promoted as way to 
diversify bank funding, the establishment of caps on issuance has been used in order to 
protect unsecured creditors. However, this kind of limits are not easy to implement in 
those cases where this market is relatively more mature and has been promoted as a 
way to finance mortgage activities as an alternative to other mortgage funding models 
5  Conclusion: 
What’s next?
23  CRH was created in 1985 with explicit guarantee by the French Government as a central agency to refinance 
French Banks. Nowadays, CRH’s bondholders do no t enjoy a state guarantee buy they have a strong privilege 
by law over CRH’s secured loans to banks.
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(i.e. the establishment of caps on issuance might be similar to suddenly removing public 
support in those countries where public guarantees are in place in order to promote the 
mortgage market).24 
One alternative to face this problem is the improvement of transparency on asset 
encumbrance (proportion of assets engaged by collateralized debt – covered bonds, 
repurchase agreements, etc), thus allowing the existence of market discipline from 
unsecured bond holders and avoiding the imposition of ad-hoc limits that might have 
undesirable effects on funding. Moreover, in order to ensure the protection of deposit 
insurance schemes and, ultimately, taxpayers’ money, this discipline could be achieved by 
the design of a deposit guarantee model where contributions are determined, among other 
factors, by the level of asset encumbrance in the balance sheet. 
Finally, covered bonds might also be affected by some macro prudential measures aimed 
at protecting not only unsecured creditors, but also the developments of the composition 
of bank’s balance sheet. That is, eligible cover assets are composed by mainly mortgage 
loans (commercial and residential), public sector exposures and ships. In this context, 
other bank credit segments are excluded such as loan to enterprises or consumer credit. 
One example that illustrates this point is the recent announcement of the Financial Stability 
Authority of Norway that considers that the rapid increase of its covered bond market 
“may give rise to structural weaknesses in banks’ funding and to detrimental incentives in 
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